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words, and is consequent by a misuse of the contemporaneity requirement.
The desire to define within the field of evidence occasionally meets with the
condemnation of practitioners. Academicians are accused of wrongly approach-
ing a subject which requires common sense and on-the-spot decisions. An Eng-
lish lawyer therefore has reason to welcome Professor Morgan's Carpentier
Lectures, culminating with the stimulating hypothetical case on hearsay. He
will also find satisfaction in assuredly sharing this enthusiasm with his Ameri-
can colleagues.
DONOVAN WATERS*
* Assistant Lecturer in Law, University College, London.
A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law. By F. H. Lawson. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Law School, 1955. Pp. xvii, 238. $4.00.
Describing his aims, Professor Lawson writes in his conclusion: "I hope I
have succeeded in what I proposed to do, to introduce you to this very different
world of the Civil Law, and to show you that the leading differences between it
and the Common Law world are not differences of method or in the ways of
handling source materials, but in the concepts themselves; and again that, al-
though the concepts often differ in their general character, the most significant
difference lies just in the simple fact that the two sets of concepts are not the
same" (p. 209). This statement of purpose and conviction suggests several
observations about the excellent book here under review.
Although A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law is useful reading for a
student beginning the comparative study of continental legal systems, the
book's greatest value is not to the beginner. A truly introductory work needs
more institutional detail and probably ought to be pitched on a lower level of
sophistication. The basic problem to which the book addresses itself is of ex-
treme difficulty-are the differences today found between the civil and the
common law systems essentially the product of economic and social conditions
or are they rather more to be explained in terms of the intellectual apparatus
and stock of conceptions through which these systems have perceived and
ordered reality? The book's great merit is its discussion of the role of concepts in
shaping the common and civil laws that we know today.
Concepts shape a body of law in at least two ways. In the first place, concepts
and the form in which they are set out have profound implications for a system's
general thinking habits. Secondly, concepts and the distinctions they embody
suggest certain results and render others, fitting less comfortably in the over-all
pattern of analysis, less likely, quite without regard to the particular functional
problem to be solved. Professor Lawson illuminates both of these matters.
Many differences between legal thinking on the Continent and in the com-
mon-law world are, in some measure, due to the relatively early concern of
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European lawyers with a comprehensive, literary statement of a great mass of
legal rules-the Corpues Juris. As a natural result, the civil lawyer's attention
traditionally centered on written texts; the academic lawyer took a place at the
center of the system. In the long run, a speculative, rational and systematic
approach to legal science was encouraged.' The civil law, instead of focusing its
attention on the law currently administered in the courts, has thus historically
emphasized a general body of rules in the conviction that, though they might
not now be, they would in due time become the law in action.
Professor Lawson also discusses in admirable fashion many of the concepts
today found in the civil and the common laws, considering particularly the
extent to which these concepts have produced results different from those
which the systems might have reached through a purely functional approach to
the problems to be resolved. The continental classification as a part of property
law of many matters that we treat in the law of torts furnishes one example. 2
In German law, problems handled in the common law under the tort rules re-
lating to nuisance are treated as going to the ambit of ownership and form part
of the law of property. "[Tihis attitude of mind led German law to limit the
remedy, if no fault were proved in the neighbor, to a declaration or injunction"
(p. 144). The problems of formation and form in the law of contracts are further
areas in which the stock of concepts with which the various systems operate
have had profound implications for the solution of practical problem.'
A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law contains abundantly the insights
of the learned and wise scholarship of one whose interests led him beyond the
confines of his native legal system to a profound study of the legal systems of
continental Europe.
ARTmUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN*
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
'See generally pp. 62-81, 161-69.
2 See pp. 143-45.
3See pp. 113-35, 148-52, 157-73; for another discussion of certain of these problems con-
suit von Mehren, The French Civil Code and Contract-a Comparative Analysis of Forma-
tion and Form, 15 La. L. Rev. 687 (1955).
Transnational Law. By Philip C. Jessup. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1956. Pp. 113. $3.00.
This little book contains the three Storrs lectures delivered by Professor
Jessup at Yale last winter. Within the tradition of those lectures, made great
by such as Cardozo, Pound, Becker, Hutchins and Radin, Jessup wrestles with
large jurisprudential problems. He focuses attention upon neglected areas of
what he calls "transnational law" and suggests an approach which is quite dif-
ferent-and much more sensible-than that of more traditional scholarship.
"Law" for Jessup is composed of all rules and practices which regulate ac-
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